Posted 4:23 PM by Dil
Iraq Echoes French Experience in Algeria
Andrew J. Bacevich, LA Times

LOS ANGELES, 11 April 2004 ? Day by day, the evidence mounts that an ugly war is turning uglier. US and coalition troop losses, which have again spiked upward, provide one measure of that ugliness. The ratcheting up of American firepower and the climbing toll of Iraqi dead, many of them evidently innocent bystanders caught in the crossfire, provide a second. But there is a third measure, perhaps the most troubling of all: Hints that the discipline of US forces is beginning to fray.

In a story that has not attracted widespread attention but should, The Washington Post has reported a second incidence of an army battalion commander being cited for misconduct. The first episode involved terrorizing an Iraqi prisoner. The more recent involved American soldiers dumping a pair of Iraqi detainees off a bridge into the Tigris River ? a clear violation of the Geneva Convention ? and the commander being reprimanded. Iraqis claim one detainee drowned. Welcome to urban guerrilla warfare ? a type of war radically different from the United States? last unhappy encounter with guerrillas. In Vietnam, intense fighting was concentrated in the countryside. South Vietnam?s mountains and jungles offered Communist guerrillas sanctuary, concealment and a base of operations. Major cities saw heavy combat only rarely, as during the famous 1968 Tet offensive.

In Iraq, the situation is the reverse. The countryside is a barren wasteland of little use to the fighers. The dense and complicated urban landscape, by comparison, offers an ideal operational environment. So cities such as Baghdad and Fallujah have become focal points of resistance. Here the fighers hide, draw sustenance and launch their most effective attacks against coalition forces.

This is where the Algerian parallel becomes instructive. In the Algerian war for independence, which began in 1954 and lasted until 1962, cities also played a central role. Control of Algiers, the capital, was the war?s primary bone of contention and, hence, the site of the bitter struggle that pitted Algerian ?terrorists?? against the French ?forces of order.??

In their efforts to destroy the National Liberation Front, French authorities found that conventional tactics did not work. To abide by the traditional law of war was to concede to the other side an enormous advantage. So, in their frustration, the French opted to fight a ?dirty war,?? employing systematic torture, extrajudicial killings and their own brand of terrorism.

The effect was dramatic: French forces made impressive tactical gains, temporarily dismantled much of the resistance network and regained control of Algiers ? at the cost of mobilizing the Algerian people against any possibility of continued French rule. The army destroyed the last shreds of French legitimacy in Algeria and thereby laid the foundation for eventual French defeat.

This process was brilliantly captured in Gillo Pontecorvo?s recently re-released 1967 docudrama, ?The Battle of Algiers.?? Last summer, perhaps to remind itself of the dangers of winning battles in ways that lose wars, the Pentagon screened Pontecorvo?s film for Defense Department officials. But one wonders whether the lessons making their way into the field are the right ones.

In one of the film?s most famous scenes, reporters question the hard-as-nails French commander, sent to clean up Algiers, about rumors of torture and assassination. We are just doing what you sent us to do, Col. Mathieu replies ? quibbling about the methods that must be employed is rank hypocrisy. Alas, there are signs that Mathieu?s attitude may be taking hold among the US troops in Iraq. Asked about the punishments meted out for the Tigris River incident, an American soldier told the Post, ?It?s a little like the French colonel in `The Battle of Algiers.? ... You?re all complaining about the tactics I am using to win the war, but that?s what I am doing ? winning the war.??

To which, however much they may empathize with those sent to wage this ugly war, American political and military leaders must emphatically reply: Not true and not acceptable. Indiscipline, lawlessness and the excessive use of force will not guarantee victory in Iraq; indeed, the reverse is true.

The French experience in Algeria stands as a warning: Down that road lies not only defeat but also dishonor.

? Andrew J. Bacevich, a professor of international relations at Boston University, is a fellow at the American Academy in Berlin.

Posted 2:18 PM by Dil
LONDON (AFP) — Former British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd on Saturday sharply criticised Washington's policy in Iraq, saying the United States was mistaken in believing it could impose democracy in the war-shattered country through the use of force.
"You really don't win hearts and minds by filling hospitals and mortuaries," said Hurd, who was foreign secretary between 1979 and 1983 in the Conservative government of Margaret Thatcher.

Hurd was referring to the recent fighting in Iraq between US forces and hardline Sunni and Shiite Muslims that has left hundreds of Iraqis dead and hundreds more wounded.

"The idea that you could actually not just get rid of a tyrant but then impose democracy by the means we have been using is, I think, contradicted by most people who have any knowledge of the area," Hurd told BBC Radio.

He said the recent upsurge in violence was "almost inevitable" and added that the US-led coalition should hand over power to Iraqis who have real influence in the country and not just those who have "curried favour" with the Pentagon.

Hurd also criticised Britain's close support for the US administration over Iraq and urged Prime Minister Tony Blair to send an envoy to Baghdad to explain his government's position.

He said someone such as former NATO secretary, Lord Robertson, could carry out such a mission.

Hurd's open criticism of Blair's government was unusual in that the Conservative party has so far refrained from criticising the Labour Party's policy on Iraq and has in general backed the US-led invasion.

Meanwhile, British Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon defended government policy, saying life had become much better in Iraq a year after the overthrow of President, Saddam Hussein, despite current violence.

There was a "sense of real tangible progress in the country," he told the BBC:

"I accept that we have got to do more to sort out the security situation, but we are not going to do that by sitting back and allowing extremists, terrorists to attack and kill, not only coalition forces but also Iraqis themselves trying to rebuild their own country."

Asked if Britain still supported US policy on Iraq, Hoon replied: "I am perfectly happy to say 'yes' to that question." Blair is set to go to the US next Thursday and Friday for talks with President George W. Bush and United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan.

Posted 2:16 PM by Dil
but Washington has already lost Iraq and its continued rule of the country is not conducive to peace in the region.

Posted 12:46 PM by Dil
Hardliner Made New Interior Minister in Iraq

Guest Post by Stirling Newberry

On the outside, with Coalition critic Ghazi al-Yawir being sent to Fallujah to negotiate a cease fire, it might seem that the US policy in Iraq has softened. However, the substansive actions of the last 24 hours point to a planned crack down, with a new Interior Minister noted for his "law and order" views, and the announcement by the Pentagon that Iraq's forces will remain under US control after the hand over. With the lifting of the arms embargo to Iraq, the ground is set for an escalation of conflict should the Intifada not back down to US demands.

After pressuring the old Interior Minister, Nori al Badran, to resign, military governor Bremer appointed hardliner and long time Provisional Iraqi Governing Council member Samir Shakir Mahmoud Sumaiday to the Interior Minister Post.

Mahmoud's appointment, combined with the decision to lift sanctions against weapons sales and exports to Iraq, signal that the US is going forward with preparations for an all out "Iraqetization" of the occupation, with the intent of equipping the police force. Sumaiday is a proponent of an appointed new Iraqi government, a "security first" policy and a refusal to negotiate with violent or even dissident elements in Iraq.

Samir Shakir Mahmoud Sumaiday speaks excellent English, and has represented the Governing Council in both interviews and at meetings designed to promote the US vision of Iraq reconstruction - particularly the necessity of an extensive oil exploration and drilling program, and the use of the oil money to first and foremost equip a major security apparatus. He has acted as a liaison to socialist groups in Iraq, and represents a firmly "secularist" view on the shape of the new Iraqi legal code.

He was appointed to the Council on 13 July, 2003, and then made head of the Governing Council's Media Committee, equivalent to the Information Minister in all but name. One of his first jobs was explaining why the bodies of Saddam's sons were not buried immediately, but instead sent to Baghdad.

As a member of the governing council, he had been the most visible member of the "Select" camp of the make up of the new government, and admits that there has been "polarization" on the issue. At least one critic has stated that he himself was responsible for much of that polarization. Later he backed down saying that all council members believed in the importance of elections as quickly as possible.

In September of last year he issued an order to ban Al-Jazeera citing "bad behavior" on the part of the Arab network, and that the media would "get the signal loud and clear". His decision at the time was sharply criticized by the International Federation of Journalists. In October he issued a communiqu? on the formation of a war crimes tribunal under a US imposed statute. He had also been the point man with the UN on Environmental and Cultural Issues during the late months of 2003.

In his spokesman role, he began early this year he to take point on criticizing militias, repeating the criticisms from the US Military that people "did not like the militias" and stating that they were "trying to destroy what we have built in Iraq". He gained visibility recently as condemning the attacks on Mercenaries in Fallujah - saying he felt as "much as any American." and was quick to blame the previous regime for the circumstances which lead to the attacks. He is frequently thought of as being "Bremer's man", prone to crowing with rhetoric such as:



"For the next 100 years this day will be mentioned as one of the most important in Iraq's history," said council member Samir Shaker Mahmoud. "This will be remembered in the annals of history as a turning point in relations between the state and citizens in this country and in the region."



He has also publicly endorsed the "flypaper" theory that asserts that Iraq is the central front against Al-Qaeda, in remarks made to the Italian Press in October of 2003.

His promotion to Interior Minister is in line with his membership on the Council's "Security Committee", it is he who drafted the recommendations for 2 Billion to be spent on security in Iraq to train an internal police force - and that the money should be spent quickly - within 18 months of being allocated.

For all of the increasing visibility of Samir Shakir Mahmoud Sumaiday as a spokesman - he is tall, white haired and sharp featured, and makes an imposing presence and is popular with reporters - his resume is extremely light. Described repeatedly as a "writer and entrepreneur", and having very high name recognition among Iraqis - polling at 84% - he is also someone who almost no one has an opinion of - with only 15% having a favorable or unfavorable view of him.

However, taken together, his public statements paint a clear picture as someone who has been unwavering in toeing the US line on Iraq, and an active and charismatic spokesman for it. His promotion to Interior Minister sends a clear signal that the US intends to escalate, not negotiate, through he current crisis.

Posted 7:07 AM by Dil
This Vietnam generation of Americans has not learnt the lessons of history
By Niall Ferguson
(Filed: 10/04/2004)


Around this time last year I had a conversation in Washington that summed up what was bound to go wrong for America in Iraq. I was talking to a mid-ranking official in the US Treasury about American plans for the post-war reconstruction of the Iraqi economy. She had just attended a meeting on precisely that subject. "So what kind of historical precedents have you been considering?" I asked. "The post-Communist economies of Eastern Europe," she replied. "We have quite a bit of experience we can draw on from the 1990s."



When I suggested that the problems of privatisation in Poland might not prove relevant on the banks of the Euphrates, she seemed surprised. And when I suggested that she and her colleagues ought at least to take a look at the last Anglophone occupation of Iraq, her surprise turned to incredulity. Not for the first time since crossing the Atlantic, I was confronted with the disturbing reality about the way Americans make policy. Theory looms surprisingly large. Neoconservative theory, for instance, stated that the Americans would be welcomed as liberators, just as economic theory put privatisation on my interlocutor's agenda. The lessons of history come a poor second, and only recent history - preferably recent American history - gets considered.

That's why there hasn't been a month since the invasion of Iraq last year without some clapped-out commentator warning that Iraq could become "another Vietnam". For many Americans - including the Democratic contender for the presidency, John Kerry - the only history relevant to American foreign policy is the history of the Vietnam War. True, the Department of Defence has commissioned some ambitious historical studies. In August 2001, Donald Rumsfeld's office produced "Strategies for Maintaining US Predominance", which compared America's bid to establish "full spectrum dominance" with the attempts of previous empires. Most of it, however, consisted of pretty superficial economics and the conclusion was that technological change has put the US in a league of its own, so more detailed comparative study would be superfluous.

There was amazement last year when I pointed out in the journal Foreign Affairs that in 1917 a British general had occupied Baghdad and proclaimed: "Our armies do not come into your cities and lands as conquerors or enemies, but as liberators." By the same token, scarcely any American outside university history departments is aware that within just a few months of the formal British takeover of Iraq, there was a full-scale anti-British revolt.

What happened in Iraq last week so closely resembles the events of 1920 that only a historical ignoramus could be surprised. It began in May, just after the announcement that Iraq would henceforth be a League of Nations "mandate" under British trusteeship. (Nota bene, if you think a handover to the UN would solve everything.) Anti-British demonstrations began in Baghdad mosques, spread to the Shi'ite holy centre of Karbala, swept on through Rumaytha and Samawa - where British forces were besieged - and reached as far as Kirkuk.

Contrary to British expectations, Sunnis, Shi'ites and even Kurds acted together. Stories abounded of mutilated British bodies. By August the situation was so desperate that the British commander appealed to London for poison gas bombs or shells (though these turned out not to be available). By the time order had been restored in December - with a combination of aerial bombardment and punitive village-burning expeditions - British forces had sustained over 2,000 casualties and the financial cost of the operation was being denounced in Parliament. In the aftermath of the revolt, the British were forced to accelerate the transfer of power to a nominally independent Iraqi government, albeit one modelled on their own form of constitutional monarchy.

I am willing to bet that not one senior military commander in Iraq today knows the slightest thing about these events. The only consolation is that maybe some younger Americans are realising that the US has lessons to learn from something other than its own supposedly exceptional history. The best discussion of the 1920 revolt that I have come across this year was presented by a young Chicago-based graduate named Daniel Barnard at a Harvard University history conference. This week at New York University it was the economics undergraduates who organised a question and answer session for three senior UN diplomats, including the current (German) president of the Security Council. Their questions - particularly about the likely consequences of a premature American withdrawal - seemed a great deal better informed about the realities of modern imperialism than the anodyne stuff routinely trotted out by the White House.

The high quality of political debate in the American universities suggests that the delusion of American "exceptionalism" may be waning. But for the time being US policy in Iraq is in the hands of a generation who have learnt nothing from history except how to repeat other people's mistakes.

• Niall Ferguson's book Colossus: The Rise and Fall of the American Empire will be published next month by Penguin. His television documentary American Colossus will be broadcast on Channel 4 in June. Adam Nicolson is away

Posted 4:08 PM by Dil
9 Apr 2004 20:38 GMT DJ US Powell:No Signs Of Sunni-Shiite Alliance In Iraq -Fox
Copyright © 2004, Dow Jones Newswires

NEW YORK (Dow Jones)--U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell said Friday that there are no signs that rival Sunni and Shiite Muslim factions in Iraq have joined forces as violence escalates across a broad swath of the country.

However, Powell, in an interview with Fox News acknowledged that there may be some low-level contact between the two factions.

"There might be some tactical-level contact between the two. There has been some evidence of that, but over the past 24 hours, I have seen nothing to suggest that there is some great alliance that is forming between the Shias and the Sunnis. They have different interests," Powell told Fox News.

Powell noted that in Sunni-dominated areas, U.S.-led coalition forces are still likely dealing with the former regime and "criminal elements" who joined them.

Under the regime of deposed Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein, Sunnis generally prospered while Shiite Muslims were often persecuted.

Recent Shiite-led resistance, Powell said, has been instigated by radical anti-U.S. cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, and his followers represent "a relatively small number of Shia."

Posted 10:29 AM by Dil
The American fear of such a development was articulated this week by Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, head of the occupation forces, when he told a press conference in Baghdad: "The danger is we believe there is a linkage that may be occurring at the very lowest levels between the Sunnis and Shiites. We have to work very hard to ensure that it remains at the tactical level."

http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2004/04/09/1081326927088.html

Posted 2:43 AM by Dil
Iraq war undermining battle against Al Qaeda: Musharraf
(AFP)

7 April 2004



SYDNEY - Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf complained on Wednesday that the war in Iraq was drawing resources from the battle against Al Qaeda leaders and their supporters hiding in Pakistan and Afghanistan. In an interview to be broadcast on Monday night on Australian public television SBS, Musharraf said his government was receiving ”very minimal” assistance as it tried to pacify tribal areas along the Afghan border where leaders of Al Qaeda and the former Afghan Taleban regime are believed hiding.


Asked if the US-led Iraq war has been a distraction from the battle against Al Qaeda and Taleban remnants by diverting resources from Afghanistan and Pakistan, Musharraf replied: “Yes indeed”.

“Money needs to be spent in our tribal areas, where these Al Qaeda ... or Taleban government agents are, (where) we are operating against them,” he told the SBS news program Dateline in remarks that were released in advance.

“We need to carry out reconstruction in the area, (the) army is doing it and the civilians are also doing it,” he said.

“Now all this needs money and we are getting some assistance, which is very minimal,” he said, adding that more funds were needed to bring the tribal areas into “mainstream” life.

The Pakistani leader also complained that the international security force in Afghanistan (ISAF) was not doing enough to help the central government maintain control over the sprawling country.

“The US forces are acting very well, but the ISAF, let me tell you, that very recently they didn’t really want to get out of Kabul,” he said.

Outside Kabul, he said, there are “12 or 13 power centers” held by warlords who will continue to act independently “unless there is a force to control that”.